Chain-store pricing and the structure of retail markets by Olczak, Matthew
Chain-store pricing and the structure of retail
markets∗
Matthew Olczak†
Aston Business School, Aston University, UK
February 2014
Abstract
This paper examines competition between chain-stores and indepen-
dent retailers in the UK retail opticians’ market. We demonstrate that
the pricing policy adopted by chain-stores can determine the impact
their entry has on independent retailers. Crucially, in this market
the chain-store retailers set an identical national price across all local
markets. Our results suggest that this pricing strategy lessens the
detrimental effect competition from chain-stores has on independent
retailers.
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1 Introduction
Chain-stores are increasingly dominating many retail markets, for example
in the UK multiple retailers increased their market share from around 23%
to 65% between 1950 and 19951. In addition, the Competition Commission
(2008) found that since the 1950s there has been a significant decline in the
number of specialist stores. Within the policy literature this has generated
some concern, in particular due to the impact on product choice and local
economies2. However, as discussed below, empirical evidence on the impact
chain-store entry has on smaller retailers is mixed.
This paper examines competition between chain-stores and independent
retailers in the retail opticians’ market in England. Deregulation of this in-
dustry in the mid 1980s brought about many significant changes, particularly
the removal of restrictions on entry and advertising3. This immediately lead
to rapid entry and growth of chain-store retailers, increasing their market
share from 46% to 75% between 1985 and 19914. A key feature of chain-
store opticians is that, like a number of other chain-store retailers5, they set
a single national price6.
In contrast, in other industries chain-stores tailor their prices to local
market conditions7. This practice has raised some policy concern. For exam-
1Burt and Sparks (2003).
2See for example New Economics Foundation (2005) and House of Commons, All Party
Small Shops Group (2006).
3See Davies et al. (2004, chapter 2) for a discussion of the impact deregulation had on
competition.
4Fulop and Warren (1993, p.267).
5For example Tesco, the largest supermarket retailer in the UK.
6See OFT (2009), para. 31.
7For example Staples and Office Depot in the US (see Dalkir and Warren-Boulton,
1999).
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ple, in their 2000 investigation of the UK groceries industry, the Competition
Commission was concerned over the common use at that time of price flexing,
defined as: ‘setting retail prices across different geographic areas in the light
of competitive conditions, such variations not being related to costs’8. One
reason for their concern appears to have been the possibility of a link between
price flexing and below-cost selling. The fear is that such strategies may in
particular adversely effect smaller convenience stores (see also Association of
Convenience Stores, 2006).
Dobson and Waterson (2005) consider the rationale for chain-stores to
choose to adopt such a pricing strategy. In their theoretical model a chain-
store faces competition in some local markets and enjoys a monopoly position
in others. Compared to when it sets different prices across local markets,
under a national pricing strategy the chain-store sets a lower price in the
monopoly markets but higher prices in markets where it faces competition.
They show that this can be profitable because competition in the competitive
markets is dampened.
We demonstrate that whether chain-stores adopt national or local pricing
strategies can affect the impact chain-store entry has on independent retail-
ers. The starting point for our empirical analysis is a methodology developed
by Bresnahan and Reiss (B&R) (1991). This uses evidence on the relation-
ship between the number of firms and the market size to make inferences
about the degree of competition. In order to illustrate this, consider a mar-
ket where at least X consumers are needed to support a monopolist. If a
rival was also present in the market competition would lead to prices below
8Competition Commission (2000), para. 2.409, p. 90.
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below the monopoly level. A fall in margins means a firm must sell to more
consumers in order to break even. Consequently, a market with a total of
more than 2X consumers is needed to support the two competing retailers.
Therefore, examining how much larger the market size needs to be to sup-
port an additional firm provides information on the intensity of competition.
We draw upon a recent literature which introduces firm heterogeneity to this
methodology. Dinlersoz (2004) introduces competition between chain-store
and independent retailers using a vertical product differentiation framework.
In the manner of B&R this leads to predictions on the relationship between
the number of each type of retailer and market size. Dinlersoz then finds
evidence consistent with these predictions in the Californian retail alcoholic
beverage industry.
As discussed in the next section, the model developed by Dinlersoz fits the
characteristics of the retail opticians’ market in England, with one exception.
The one exception is that Dinlersoz models competition between chain-stores
as Cournot competition. This implies that the price a chain-store sets will
vary across local markets, depending upon the number of chain-store rivals
present. To fit the opticians’ market, in section 2.4 we modify the Dinlersoz
model to allow for chain-store national pricing strategies. Introducing na-
tional pricing leads to a revised prediction on the relationship between the
number of independents and market size.
In the opticians’ market, evidence consistent with the prediction under
national pricing is then found in markets where chain-stores are present.
This suggests that chain-stores adopting national pricing strategies helps to
protect independents from the intense local competition between chains that
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would otherwise occur in markets where a number of chain-stores are present.
Unlike Dinlersoz, our sample also includes markets where no chain-stores
are present. Therefore, we also test for differences in the relationship between
the number of independents and market size, depending upon whether or
not a chain-store is present. Here, a key issue is that chain-store entry is
endogenously determined. The previous literature has dealt with this issue
in a number of ways. Griffith and Harmgart (2012) treat the number of
larger supermarkets as an exogenous determinant of the number of smaller
’top-up’ shops, arguing that this is reasonable because typically consumers
make their main purchases from larger ’one-stop’ stores with smaller stores
receiving any residual demand. Cleeren et al. (2008) and Toivanen and
Waterson (2005) exploit the sequential order of entry in the industries they
study. Our approach is closest to (Borraz et al., 2013) who use variability
in the availability of permits for commercial expansion as an instrument for
supermarket entry. In a similar fashion, we make use of information on the
number of planning grants for retail premises that have been accepted in the
preceding years. Crucially, this data is separated between grants for minor
and major retail premises. Therefore, this allows us to distinguish between
retail premises suitable for independents and chain-store outlets. In other
settings (Igami, 2011 and Sobel and Dean, 2008), geographic affiliations have
been used as an alternative instrument.
Our results provide some evidence to suggest that the nature of compe-
tition between independents is affected by whether or not chain-stores are
present in the market. When no chain-store is present, competitive intensity
between independents increases as the number of independents goes up.
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A related literature has examined the impact of chain-store entry on
smaller stores, typically focusing on the supermarket industry. As Borraz
et al. (2013) conclude, the findings from this literature on the impact chain-
store entry has is mixed. For example Jia (2008) finds that the entry of
Wal-Mart has a substantial negative effect on smaller discount competitors,
whereas Sobel and Dean (2008) find that Wal-Mart has no long-run effect
on overall small business activity. In contrast, Igami (2011) finds that entry
of large supermarkets in Japan may force out other large scale competitors,
but have a positive effect on smaller retailers. In line with our findings, it is
argued that this is because the smaller retailers are sufficiently differentiated
from the larger outlets. In contrast to these previous papers, we examine a
different industry and to the best of our knowledge are the first to focus on
the different effects chain-store national rather than local pricing strategies
can have.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 shows how
the predictions of the Dinlersoz (2004) model differ when national pricing
is introduced. Section 3 describes the retail opticians’ market in England
and section 4 examines the relationship between the number of independents
and market size in markets where chain-stores are present. Section 5 then
compares markets with and without chain-store presence. Finally, section 6
offers some brief conclusions and avenues for further research.
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2 A model of retail competition
Retail competition between chain-stores and independents will be examined
using a model of vertical product differentiation based on Dinlersoz (2004).
Firstly the assumptions of the model are outlined and then the number of
independent outlets that can profitably operate in a local market is examined.
This is shown to crucially depend upon the pricing policy adopted by chain-
store retailers.
2.1 Assumptions
This section describes the modeling assumptions made by Dinlersoz (2004)
and outlines why these assumptions are appropriate for the opticians’ market
in England.
Competition takes place between chain-store retailers (denoted by sub-
script C) and independent retailers (I) within local markets which will vary
in size S (measured by the number of consumers). Consumers have heteroge-
neous tastes for quality captured by α, which measures their marginal utility
from one unit of quality. In each local market α is assumed to be uniformly
distributed over an interval [α, α¯] with α > 0 and α¯−α = 1. For a consumer
of type α, the utility derived from a product of quality θ sold at price p is:
u(p, θ;α) =
 αθ − p if αθ ≥ p0 otherwise (1)
The quality levels of the different retail outlets (θI and θC) are identical within
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retailer type and exogenously determined9. Furthermore, the independent
retailers are assumed to produce a higher quality product (i.e. θI > θC).
Without loss of generality, this quality differential is normalised so that θI −
θC = 1. The assumption that independent opticians supply a higher quality
service could be justified in terms of a more personal service, with consumers
benefiting from repeated interaction with the same practitioner. In fact,
one of the concerns of opponents of deregulation was a reduction in service
quality10. In addition, independent opticians have recently suggested that
they were able to differentiate their product from that offered by chain-stores
by offering a higher quality product and service11.
Fixed costs are denoted by f and variable costs c. In order to allow for
their typically larger scale, chain-store outlets are assumed to have a total
cost function (CC) with increasing returns to scale,
12 given by: CC(qC) =
fC + cCqC . In contrast, the independent retailers have a total cost function
(CI) given by: CI = fI +cIq
2
I . This implies a U-shaped average cost function
for the independent retailers with minimum efficient scale at
q∗I = (fI/cI)
1/2 (2)
This is consistent with evidence that chain-store opticians have a significant
9See section 4.3 for a discussion of the impact of allowing chain-stores to set their
quality level strategically.
10See for example Fulop and Warren (1993) pp. 262-64.
11OFT (2009), para. 25.
12In the Dinlersoz model increasing returns to scale are not required, however, the
minimum efficient scale for chain-stores must be sufficiently greater that of the independent
retailers (see Dinlersoz, 2004, p. 216). Under Cournot competition (see section 2.3) this
allows the chain-stores to expand output as the market size increases. Furthermore, once
national pricing is introduced in section 2.4 the predictions are unaffected by the specific
chain-store cost function.
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scale advantage over independents in part because significant buyer power
enables them to obtain lower cost from suppliers13. Furthermore, figures
provided below in section 3 indicate that in this market chains-stores have
a much higher value of sales per store than other retailers, consistent with
these being larger scale outlets.
2.2 The number of independent outlets in a local mar-
ket
Both the number of chain-store and independent outlets in each local market
are determined by the free entry equilibrium. The independent retailers are
assumed to act as a price-taking competitive fringe. Evidence consistent with
this assumption in the opticians’ market is provided by this description of
pricing following a competition authority investigation:
“... local opticians typically base their pricing on the national
decisions taken by Specsavers, which is described by the parties
as well as by other multiples and independent industry reports
as the market leader and, as a result of its aggressive pricing
strategy, the principal price-setter”.14
In section 5 we will test to see whether Specsavers (the leading chain-
store) plays a different price setting role from other chain-store retailers.
Perfect competition between the independents then means that in the
free-entry equilibrium they price down to a level equal to marginal costs at
the minimum efficient scale. Therefore, from (2):
p∗I = 2(fIcI)
1/2 (3)
13OFT (2009), para. 22-3.
14OFT (2009), para. 31.
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Using (1) the consumer indifferent between the product offered by the chain-
stores and the independent stores has marginal utility of α∗, where
α∗ = pI − pC (4)
As in Dinlersoz (2004) each local market is assumed to be fully covered with
all consumers purchasing one unit of the product from either an independent
or a chain-store retailer15. This means that total demand in a local market is
equal to S. In addition, we focus on parameter values such that both types
of retailers are present in each market16. Consequently, consumers for which
α¯ ≥ α > α∗ buy from an independent retailer and from (4) the local market
demand for the independent retail sector is
DI(pI , pC) = S(α¯− pI + pC) (5)
In contrast, chain-stores sell to consumers with α∗ ≥ α ≥ α and the total
chain-store sector demand is given by:
DC(pC , pI) = S(pI − pC − α) (6)
Because the independent retailers each produce an output level which is
invariant to market size (see (2)), the total number of independent retailers
that can profitably operate in a market (N∗I ≡ DI/qI) crucially depends on
15This requires the quality level of a chain-store to be sufficiently high (but not as high
as independents) so that even consumers with the lowest marginal utility (α) choose to
buy the product (for the precise condition see Dinlersoz, 2004, footnote 8).
16This requires a sufficient degree of product differentiation (see Dinlersoz, 2004, foot-
note 9).
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the total demand for the independent sector. Using (2), (3) and (5), this can
be written as:
N∗I =
S
(
α¯− 2(fIcI)1/2 + pC
)
(fI/cI)1/2
(7)
This shows that the number of independent retailers in each local market will
depend upon the price set by chain-stores (pC). As pC falls, the proportion
of the market served by chain-stores increases (α∗ rises). This reduces the
total demand for the independents’ product and, therefore, the number of
independent outlets that can profitably compete falls. As will now be demon-
strated, this implies that the pricing strategy adopted by chain-stores has an
important impact on the number of independent retailers. The next section
summarises the case where the price a chain-store charges differs across local
markets as described in detail in Dinlersoz (2004).
2.3 Local pricing by chain-stores
Dinlersoz assumes that all chain-stores compete a la Cournot taking the
price set by the independent retailers as given. Under Cournot competition
the price charged by chain-store retailers depends upon the number of chain-
store rivals it faces in the local market. Therefore, chain-stores are effectively
adopting local pricing strategies. From (7) it can then be shown that17:
Proposition 1. If chain-stores adopt local pricing, the number of indepen-
dent outlets in the local market will increase less than proportionately with
an increase in the market size, but at an increasing rate.
This is because as the market size increases chain-store entry occurs, lead-
ing to a fall in the chain-store price. Therefore, the number of chain-stores
17This is shown formally in Dinlersoz (2004, p.218), equation (4).
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increases less than proportionately with an increase in market size. This
is the intuition underlying the B&R approach described in the introduction.
However, the fall in the chain-store price also effects the independent retailers’
share of the market. Crucially, from (6) some consumers will switch from the
independents’ high quality product to the chain-stores’ lower quality prod-
uct. Consequently, the number of independent outlets also increases less than
proportionately with an increase in the market size. As the number of chain-
stores entering the local market continues to increase, additional chain-store
entry has less of an effect on price and fewer additional consumers switch to
chain-stores. Therefore, as the market size increases further the number of
independent outlets can increase almost proportionately with an increase in
the market size.
2.4 National pricing by chain-stores
We can now consider how the results of the Dinlersoz model change if the
chain-stores adopt national pricing, thus making the model fit the English
retail opticians’ market. Suppose the chain-stores all set an identical na-
tionally determined price. This national price will be set by a chain-store in
order to maximize profits across all the local markets in which it operates.
As long as the total number of markets in which the chain-store operates is
sufficiently large the impact of an individual local market is negligible and
the national price can be modelled as exogenously determined within a given
local market. It then follows from (7) that:
Proposition 2. If chain-stores adopt national pricing strategies, the number
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of independent outlets will increase proportionately with an increase in market
size, for all sizes of market.
Because both chain-stores and independent firms now set a price that is
invariant in the market size, the proportion of consumers preferring chain-
stores to independent outlets and vice versa is fixed for all market sizes.
Comparing Propositions 1 and 2 shows that the relationship between
the number of independent retailers and market size depends upon whether
chain-stores adopt national or local pricing strategies. In section 4 evidence
on this relationship between the number of independent retailers and market
size in the English retail opticians’ market will be provided. First, in section
3, the dataset is described.
3 The opticians’ market
The dataset was obtained in 2004 by downloading from the main online
business directory18 the names and postcodes of all opticians’ outlets in Eng-
land19. Table 1 shows the number of outlets owned by the largest multi-store
firms.
[Table 1 here]
As can be seen, there are four chains owning more than 150 stores20. Hence-
forth, these four will be referred to as chain-stores and all remaining outlets
18http://www.yell.com
19We omit the City of London LAD from the empirical analysis as it is principally a
business area with a very low population but a comparatively large number of opticians.
20In addition, in 2009 Dolland and Aitchison and Boots were allowed to merger by the
Office of Fair Trading (see OFT, 2009).
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as independents (Inds):
Definition. Chain-store: an optician’s store owned by Specsavers, Dolland
and Aitchison, Boots or Vision Express.
Of course, this definition of a ‘chain-store’ is somewhat arbitrary, however,
there are a number of reasons for differentiating these four from the smaller,
multi-store firms. First, as shown in Table 2, all four have a national presence
with multiple outlets in all regions21. In addition, as stated earlier, all four
chain-stores adopt national pricing strategies.
[Table 2 here]
On the other hand, with the possible exception of Optical Express the other
main multi-store firms do not have a national presence. The Optical Express
chain, established in 1991, has grown rapidly, and if this continues will soon
join the group of main chain-store retailers22. Second, the four chain-stores,
in addition to being the largest chains are also the firms in the market with
a significant brand name and prominence as a high street retailer. Despite
owning only 20% of stores (Table 1) these four chain-stores these four ac-
counted for 54% of sales by value23 and 75% of advertising expenditure24.
21Each LAD is allocated to one of 9 administrative regions covering England e.g. South-
West or London.
22However, Optical Express at the time had less than 6 stores in two of the regions.
Furthermore, figures from OFT (2009, para 39.) show that in recent years Optical Express
has continued to gain market share whilst the four chain-stores have all lost market share.
However, even by 2007 Optical Express still had a market share by value of 4.3%, which
was over a third lower than the 4th largest chain (Boots) and, therefore, arguably still
remains outside the main players.
23OFT (2009), para. 39.
24UK main media advertising expenditure on opticians and eye clinics in 2001, Keynote
(2002).
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Overall, the evidence suggests these four are the chain-stores most likely to
have a significant effect on independent outlets25.
Local markets will be defined according to Local Authority Districts
(LAD). These tend to be centered on town/cities and therefore represent
a reasonable approximation of the area in which consumer search behaviour
takes place in the opticians’ market. They are also a unit of observation for
which demographic data is readily available and importantly for our method-
ology vary considerably in size. They have also been used to define local
markets in other previous studies26.
Table 3 describes the number of opticians for all 349 LAD in our sam-
ple. The number of outlets refers to the total number of stores owned by
chain-stores whereas the number of fascias refers to the number of different
national chains present in a market. Therefore, for example, a market with
two Specsavers stores and one Boots store has three outlets but only two
fascias.
[Table 3 here]
A ‘typical’ LAD market contains 16 opticians’ outlets: 3 chain-store and 13
independent outlets. Almost 75% of markets contain less than 20 outlets. In
addition, all chain-stores have multiple outlets in one or more market.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the total number of opticians’
outlets present and the population of the local market. As we would expect,
there is clearly a positive relationship.
25The definition of a chain-store will also be widened to check for robustness of the
results, see footnote 30 and 39.
26For example Toivanen and Waterson (2005) and Sadun (2013).
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[Figure 1 here]
Whilst chain-stores are present in most of the markets in our sample,
there are 41 markets in which there are no chain-stores. As Table 4 shows
the markets where no chain-stores are present tend on average to be those
with a lower population, but there is a significant range of smaller markets
in which a chain-store may or may not be present.
[Table 4 here]
4 Testing the relationship between the num-
ber of independent retailers and market
size
4.1 Econometric specification
Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that the relationship between the number of in-
dependents and market size will differ depending on whether the chain-stores
in the market adopt local or national pricing. The following econometric
specification will allow a simple test of this proposition:
log(NIndsi) = C + α log(Populationi) + (Xi)
′β + i (8)
where the subscript i refers to an LAD market, NIndsi is the number of
independent outlets, Populationi is the LAD population and Xi is a vector
of demographic variables described in Table 5 below. The error term i is
assumed to be independent across LAD markets. The model will be esti-
mated using OLS and the use of the constant elasticity model means that
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the estimated coefficients show the proportional change in NInds for a given
change in the explanatory variable. This allows a simple test of the differing
predictions of Proposition 1 and 2. If αˆ < 1 the number of independent
outlets increases less than proportionately with an increase in market size,
consistent with local pricing (Proposition 1). In contrast, if αˆ = 1 the number
of independent outlets increases proportionately with an increase in market
size, consistent with national pricing (Proposition 2).
4.2 Demographic variables
The use of LAD markets allows the data on the number of outlets to be
matched with census demographic data, including importantly population
as a measure of market size, the number of planning applications previously
granted to capture the availability of suitable retail outlets and a range of
other variables that can then be used to control for cost and other possible
demand differences between markets. Table 5 describes all the demographic
variables that will be used27.
[Table 5 here]
Crucially for the empirical analysis below, the planning data distinguishes
between major and minor developments where the latter is defined as a site
above 1000 square meters28. It is clear that major retail developments will be
27Planning grants data is from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). All the
other variables are for 2001 except the wage data which is for 2005. Data Sources: Wage
variable: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2005, http://www.statistics.gov.
uk/downloads/theme_labour/ASHE_2005/2005_res_la.pdf. All other variables: Cen-
sus 2001, http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/census2001.asp
28See Sadun (2013) for further details on the UK planning policy and this data.
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the prime location for chain-store opticians’ outlets29, whereas, as discussed
earlier, the much smaller scale of independents means that only minor retail
developments are appropriate locations for them. Density allows for the pos-
sibility that more densely populated areas may attract additional opticians’
outlets, perhaps as they act as centre for retail activity and thus attract cus-
tomers from outside the LAD. The inclusion of age controls for the likelihood
that the demand for opticians’ services is higher, and typically more complex
sight problems exist, amongst older people. The wage variable is included
as a control variable, but has two possible interpretations as it could either
reflect firms’ cost differences between markets or higher demand due to a
more aﬄuent population. Income support claimants are entitled to a Na-
tional Health Service voucher which provides the recipient with a free sight
test and discounted spectacles or contact lenses. Therefore, it is possible
that demand could be higher in LADs with more income support claimants.
We might expect urban LADs to attract more opticians. Finally, the travel
variable captures increased demand from outside the LAD and proxies for
significant business and retail districts.
4.3 Results
The specification given in (8) will now be estimated for the 308 local markets
where one or more chain-store is present.
[Table 6 here]
29See for example http://www.insidermedia.com/insider/north-west/
78166-specsavers-unveiled-latest-merseyway-tenant.
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A t-test shows that there is no evidence that the coefficient on log(Population)
is less than one. Instead, consistent with chain-store national pricing strate-
gies, the evidence suggests that the number of independent outlets increases
proportionately with an increase in market size (Proposition 2)30.This sug-
gests that national pricing strategies can help to protect independents from
the intense competition between chains that would otherwise occur in mar-
kets where several chains operate.
In addition, the results show that the other demographic variables also
affect the number of independent retailers. A previous high number of minor
retail grants has a positive effect on the number of independents31. Likewise,
markets with an older population have more independent outlets, suggesting
demand is higher in these markets. Finally, the number of independent
outlets is also increasing in both the average wage of the LAD population
and the proportion of income support claimants32.
Dinlersoz (2004, pp. 221-2) discusses the fact that his model could be
extended to allow for quality enhancing investments by chain-stores. This
would therefore introduce an endogenous sunk cost. As in Sutton (1991),
in larger markets chain-stores could compete more intensely by escalating
expenditure on quality enhancement. Dinlersoz goes on to explain that this
would support the findings of his model as, like with a lower chain-store
price, higher quality chain-stores result in a reduction in the segment of
30This result is robust to various sensitivity tests (see Appendix A) involving the exclu-
sion of: Scrivens, Optical Express and Rayner outlets from the definition of independent
retailers (Table 7.1); the largest 10% of markets (7.2) or all London LADs (7.3).
31In contrast, if the number of major retail grants is included instead or in addition,
this has no significant effect.
32In addition, if either the density or travel variables are included their coefficients were
insignificant.
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the market served by independents. Consequently, the predictions of the
Dinlersoz model for the number of independent retailers would remain similar
to those described in section 2.3. However, this impact of chain-store quality
escalation could also occur under national pricing. In contrast, our above
finding on the relationship between the number of independents and market
size suggests that such quality escalation does not play an important role in
this market. Instead the results suggest that, like prices, chain-store quality
levels are determined at a national level, with little role for local differential
levels of non-price competition.
5 A comparison of markets with and without
chain-stores
The preceding analysis has been confined to markets in which one or more
chain-store is present. However, unlike in Dinlersoz’s study, here there are
also a number of markets where no chain-stores are present and these provide
a useful comparator for assessing the impact of chain-store presence.
First, we examine the likelihood that at least one chain-store is present
in a local market. Assume the likelihood that one or more chain-store enters
market i (z∗i ) is given by
z∗i = X
′
iγ + ui (9)
where Xi is a vector of demographic variables for market i and ui is an error
term. However, we only observe the binary decision (zi) of at least one chain-
store to entry market i. We can write the likelihood that we observe at least
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one chain-store in market i (zi = 1) as:
zi =
 1 if z
∗
i > 0
0 otherwise
If we assume the error term (ui) is normally distributed then the proba-
bility that at least one chain-store enters market i can be estimated using a
probit model. Table 8 reports the results from estimating this model for our
full sample of markets.
[Table 8 here]
This shows, as we would expect, that chain-stores are more likely to
be present in the larger markets and those where people working in the
area have typically travelled further to do so. As for independent outlets,
a higher proportion of income support claimants also has a positive impact
on the likelihood of chain-store presence, supporting the earlier suggestion
that demand is higher in such districts. Interestingly, in contrast to for
independents, both the age and wage of the population are insignificant.
This is consistent with a degree of product differentiation between the two
retail sectors. Finally, a larger number of major retail developments in the
area increases the likelihood that chain-stores will be present.
We can now estimate the specification in (8) for our full sample of markets
and allow for the possibility that chain-store presence in the market affects
both the number of independents directly and the relationship between the
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number of independents and market size:
log(NIndsi) = C+α log(Populationi)+X
′
iβ+θdumchaini+σdumchaini∗log(Populationi)+i
(10)
where dumchaini is a binary variable which equals one if at least one chain-
store is present in market i.
We can use an estimate of the likelihood of chain-store presence to cor-
rect for the fact that chain-store presence is endogenously determined33. As
discussed earlier, major retail sites are expected to be the prime location for
chain-store opticians, whereas independents are primarily located in smaller
premises. Furthermore, as Sadun (2013) demonstrates, variation in plan-
ning permission is determined by the political affiliations of the local council.
This helps to alleviate concerns that the number of planning grants accepted
is highly correlated with unobserved local demand and cost conditions34.
Therefore, we use variation in the number of previously accepted major re-
tail planning grants as an instrument for chain-store presence. In Table 9
we report the results from jointly estimating (9) and (10) with a treatment
effects model35 using full maximum likelihood36:
[Table 9 here]
33See Greene (2003, p.788) for a formal description of the correction procedure.
34In addition, the lag in the planning data also alleviates concerns that political affil-
iation is in turn highly correlated with the local market conditions. Sadun (2013) uses
the number of major planning grants as a measure of the entry (in any sector) of large
retailers. Then, using political affiliation as an instrument, estimates the impact of such
entry on employment by small retailers.
35Brown and Mergoupis (2010) show that this procedure also consistently estimates the
interaction term in (10).
36This uses information on the joint distribution of Ninds and dumchain (see Maddala,
1983, pp. 120-2.)
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Here, the estimates on the determinants of chain-store presence are very
similar to those for the probit regression reported in Table 837. For the
independent retailers, there is no evidence that the sum of the coefficients
on log(Population) and dumchain*log(Population) is less than one. There-
fore, consistent with our earlier findings, in markets where chain-stores are
present the number of independent retailers increases in proportion with an
increase in market size. In contrast, a one tailed t-test suggests that the
coefficient on log(Population) is less than one (p = 0.06) i.e. in markets
where no chain-store is present the number of independents increases less
than proportionately with an increase in market size.38
The ρ parameter reported in Table 9 measures the correlation between
the error terms in (9) and (10). Therefore, this captures the extent to which
failing to account for the endogeniety of chain-store presence by estimating
the equations jointly results in bias. However, a likelihood ratio test cannot
reject the null hypothesis that ρ = 0 and so suggests that (9) and (10) are
independent. Table 10.1 in Appendix B shows that the above results are very
similar if we estimate the equation for independents using OLS. In particular,
the coefficient on log(Population) is less than one (p < 0.05)39.
37All the results in Table 9 also remain very similar if the wage and age variables are
left out from the chain-store equation.
38If we instead estimate (10) by the alternative two-step procedure which uses the probit
estimation to correct for the endogeniety, whilst the coefficients remain similar in magni-
tude, dumchain and the interaction with market size are no longer significant at the 10%
level.
39Appendix B shows that this result is robust to the same sensitivity tests as earlier
i.e. the exclusion of: Scrivens, Optical Express and Rayner outlets from the definition of
independent retailers (Table 10.2); the largest 10% of markets (10.3) or all London LADs
(10.4). In particular, when a narrower definition of an independent retailer is used there is
stronger evidence that the coefficient on log(Population) < 1. Additional results (available
on request) suggest that when (9) and (10) are estimated jointly for these reduced samples,
they are again independent.
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Overall, these results confirm that for markets where chain-stores are
present40, the relationship between the number of independents and mar-
ket size predicted under chain-store national pricing and identified in the
empirical analysis in section 4 continues to hold. In contrast, in markets
with no chain-stores, there is some evidence to suggest that the number of
independent outlets increases less than proportionately with an increase in
market size. Interestingly, this suggests that when no chain-store is present,
competitive intensity between independents may increase as the number of
independents goes up. Therefore, this differs from the predictions of the
model developed in section 2, which focused on markets where chain-stores
were also present. It follows that the way in which independent retailers were
modelled may only be valid when chain-stores are also present and that an
alternative model may be more appropriate for other markets. The difference
in competitive conduct and market outcomes across these different markets
clearly merits further investigation.
6 Conclusion
The findings of this paper suggest that in the retail opticians’ market England
independent outlets appear to have been sheltered from the negative impact
40In additional estimations, we added further interaction terms into (10) to test for the
possibility that the number of independent retailers is also affected by the precise number
of chain-store outlets or fascias present. However, the results (available on request) suggest
that this is not the case. Instead, it is whether or not there is a chain-store present that
seems to be important. This is consistent with the theoretical model described in section
2, under national pricing. In addition, given the evidence suggesting that the Specsavers
chain acts as an industry price leader (see section 2.2), we have also looked into whether
it is in fact the presence of this chain that has a key effect on independents. However, this
appears to not be the case, again supporting the evidence that it is the presence of any
chain that is important.
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chain-store competition could have had on them. Two complementary ex-
planations for this are provided41. Firstly, the national pricing strategies
adopted by chain-stores would appear to dampen the impact their entry has
on independents. Secondly, the results suggest that in this market chain-
stores and independent retailers appeal to different segments of the market.
In particular, independents appeal more to both the elderly and higher earn-
ing consumers.
The first of these explanations implies that the chain-stores’ decisions
to adopt national pricing policies result in an increased variety of retailers
and consequently may be beneficial to consumers. However, one explanation
for national pricing strategies not allowed for in the theoretical literature
so far, is the possibility that it facilitates coordination, in particular by in-
creasing price transparency42. In contrast, the Dobson and Waterson model
described earlier is in a one-shot setting in which the chain-store has a unilat-
eral incentive to dampen competition. If coordination is facilitated, then the
benefits to consumers from national pricing become far less clear. R elatedly,
Busse (2000) uses detailed price data to suggest that by setting identical
prices across certain markets mobile telephone sellers in the US are able to
establish focal prices and coordinate their actions. Therefore, it would be
worthwhile to examine whether national pricing could also aid coordination
41This finding is also supported by the OFT (2009, para 26) who conclude that there
is no evidence to indicate that over time competition from chain-stores has lead to a
reduction in the number of independent opticians. Evidence is even provided that the
other opticians have gained market share at the expense of the four main players (para.
39).
42A similar concern was also raised in a more recent Competition Commission investi-
gation of the UK groceries market since, contrary to the period of the earlier investigation
discussed in the introduction, most of the main players had by then adopted national
pricing strategies (see Competition Commission (2008), paras. 4.98 and 8.25).
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in the retail opticians’ market.
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Appendices
A Robustness of the Results in Table 6
[Table 7 here]
B Robustness of the Results in Table 9
[Table 10 here]
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Figure 1: The number of opticians’ outlets by LAD population (S)
Table 1: The largest multi-store opticians in England
Retailer Number of outlets
Specsavers 383
Dolland and Aitchison 328
Boots 261
Vision Express 166
Scrivens 105
Optical Express 101
Rayner 73
Batemans 54
Leightons 43
Others 4303
5817
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Table 2: Retailer presence across regions of England
Retailer Number of regions in which
1 or more outlet 3 or more outlets
Specsavers 9 9
Dolland and Aitchison 9 9
Boots 9 9
Vision Express 9 9
Scrivens 7 7
Optical Express 9 9
Rayner 8 6
Batemans 2 2
Leightons 6 3
Table 3: The number of opticians’ outlets by LAD market
Mean Std Dev Min Max
Total 16.67 14.09 1 161
Chain-store fascias 2.50 1.41 0 4
Chain-store outlets 3.26 2.44 0 21
Inds 13.41 12.38 1 140
Specsavers 1.10 0.82 0 5
Dolland and Aitchison 0.94 1.06 0 9
Boots 0.75 0.71 0 4
Vision Express 0.48 0.56 0 3
31
Table 4: Population in markets with and without chain-store outlets
N Chain-stores LAD Mkts Mean Min Max Std Dev
> 0 308 148470 25949 977087 95716
0 41 75421 24457 121024 25135
All 349 139888 24457 977087 93325
Table 5: Demographic variables
Variable Description Mean Std Dev Min Max
Population LAD population (number of
people)
139888 93325 24457 977087
Major grants Total number of major
planning grants accepted
1997 - 2003
18.71 17.66 0 123
Minor grants Total number of minor plan-
ning grants accepted 1997 -
2003
232.55 255.19 1 3134
Density Number of people per
hectare
14.03 20.18 0.23 131.02
Age Mean age of LAD popula-
tion (years)
39.25 2.34 31.75 46.85
Wage Mean weekly wage of LAD
population excluding over-
time (£)
413.56 94.97 237.4 1136.5
Inc support % of LAD population claim-
ing income support
5.94 2.41 1.85 15.01
Travel % of people working in the
LAD that travel 20+km to
work
11.73 4.44 2.83 31.75
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Table 6: The relationship between the number of independent outlets and
market size when chain-stores are present
log(NInds)
Constant -18.570***
(2.185)
log(Population) 1.013***
(0.053)
Minor grants 0.00036***
(0.0001)
log(Age) 1.801***
(0.419)
log(Wage) 0.369***
(0.125)
Inc support 0.029**
(0.011)
N 308
Adj R2 0.72
***Significantly different from 0 at 1% level, ** significantly different from 0 at 5% level
and * significantly different from 0 at 10% level. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 7: The relationship between the number of independent outlets and
market size when chain-stores are present
1 2 3
log(NInds) log(NInds) log(NInds)
Constant -20.063*** -18.288*** -18.283***
(2.158) (2.343) (2.358)
log(Population) 1.001*** 0.965*** 1.015***
(0.052) (0.065) (0.065)
Minor grants 0.00033*** 0.00034*** 0.00042***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
log(Age) 2.042*** 1.749*** 1.755***
(0.414) (0.443) (0.455)
log(Wage) 0.477*** 0.444*** 0.347**
(0.124) (0.136) (0.172)
Inc support 0.035*** 0.029** 0.023
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015)
N 307 277 276
Adj R2 0.72 0.59 0.70
***Significantly different from 0 at 1% level, ** significantly different from 0 at 5% level
and * significantly different from 0 at 10% level. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 8: The likelihood of chain-store presence in a local market
dumchain
Constant -26.308**
(12.583)
log(Population) 1.260***
(0.359)
Major grants 0.027*
(0.014)
log(Density) 0.217
(0.132)
log(Age) 2.961
(2.833)
log(Wage) -0.230
(0.902)
Inc support 0.262***
(0.101)
Travel 0.141***
(0.040)
N 349
Pseudo R2 0.33
Log likelihood -85.02
***Significantly different from 0 at 1% level, ** significantly different from 0 at 5% level
and * significantly different from 0 at 10% level. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 9: Joint maximum likelihood estimation of the number of independents
and chain-store presence
dumchain log(NInds)
Constant -26.186** -15.336***
(12.665) (2.770)
log(Population) 1.271*** 0.739***
(0.360) (0.164)
Major grants 0.027*
(0.014)
Minor grants 0.0004***
(0.0001)
log(Density) 0.217
(0.132)
log(Age) 2.915 1.752***
(2.848) (0.414)
log(Wage) -0.239 0.376***
(0.906) (0.124)
Inc support 0.261*** 0.025**
(0.101) (0.012)
Travel 0.140***
(0.041)
dumchain -3.167*
(1.858)
dumchain*log(Population) 0.281*
(0.167)
N 349
ρ 0.050
(0.142)
Wald χ2 877.81***
***Significantly different from 0 at 1% level, ** significantly different from 0 at 5% level
and * significantly different from 0 at 10% level. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 10: The relationship between the number of independent outlets and
market size for all markets
1 2 3 4
log(NInds) log(NInds) log(NInds) log(NInds)
Constant -15.175*** -16.346*** -15.048*** -14.888***
(2.765) (2.720) (2.839) (2.908)
log(Population) 0.721*** 0.696*** 0.718*** 0.714***
(0.158) (0.155) (0.160) (0.161)
Minor grants 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0005***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
log(Age) 1.759*** 1.967*** 1.717*** 1.730***
(0.418) (0.411) (0.431) (0.452)
log(Wage) 0.375*** 0.476*** 0.385*** 0.360**
(0.126) (0.124) (0.133) (0.168)
Inc support 0.025** 0.031*** 0.025** 0.019
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
dumchain -3.290* -3.427* -3.093 -3.357*
(1.848) (1.818) (1.908) (1.912)
dumchain*log(Population) 0.294* 0.306* 0.277 0.300*
(0.165) (0.162) (0.170) (0.170)
N 349 348 331 317
Adj R2 0.71 0.71 0.63 0.69
***Significantly different from 0 at 1% level, ** significantly different from 0 at 5% level
and * significantly different from 0 at 10% level. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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